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Argument 
1. APPELLANT DID NOT BEAR A FIDUCIARY DUTY TOWARDS 
APPELLEE. 
Appellee/s (SAI) brief claims (pg 25, In 8-15)) that Appellant (AMC) owed 
a fiduciary duty to SAI due to a agent-principal relationship between the parties, 
correctly citing Restatement (Second) of Agency for such proposition, but 
incorrectly claiming that AMC as the agent of SAI. Within the same section in 
which SAI claims that AMC is its agent, SAI repeatedly refers to its and AMC's 
"co-employees"' (pg 27, In 3, In 5, In 9, In 11 and In 17). AMC does not dispute 
that such persois were co-employees, but does dispute SATs analysis that AMC 
"had influence or superiority over SAI because it controlled the process of placing 
health insurance" (pg 27, In 12-13). 
The consistent and repeated use of the term "co-employees" clearly states 
that both parties had responsibilities and obligations towards such persons. AMC 
was responsible for one aspect of the relationship, that is, supplying health 
insurance. SAI was responsible for the remaining employer obligations. Thus, the 
parties were in a comparatively equivalent position, both having shared 
responsibilities, duties and rights with respect to their co-employees. While SAI 
in gnomic fashion declares that AMC had "influence" or "superiority" (pg 27, In 
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12)over SAI regarding the health insurance, there is no recitation of facts 
supporting such a conclusion. In fact, the parties did have co-employees for which 
they were equally responsible in all aspects of the relationship. It is admitted that 
AMC did fail to timely pay certain health insurance premiums, but there is no 
evidence that AMC had an exclusive fiduciary duty to SAI for the payment of such 
premiums. Tho fiduciary duty existed towards the individual "co-employees" 
insuring that health insurance coverage with respect to such "co-employees" was 
consistent, regular and reliable. In such fiduciary responsibility to the co-
employees, AMC was admittedly deficient. But there was no deficiency with 
respect to SAI, for no fiduciary duty exists between SAI and AMC. 
Utah case law is replete with references to fiduciary duties in many 
categories, but 10 references exist regarding fiduciary duties for those sharing 
responsibilities for co-employees. Utah cases on the aspects of fiduciary duty 
include: 
1. Attorney-client fiduciary responsibility: Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 
974 (2003); Bennett v. Jones, 70 P.3d 17 (2003); Walter v. Stewart, 67 P.3d 1042 
(2003); Normcn v. Arnold, 57 R3d 997 (2002), Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 
(2002); Kilpatrickv. Wiley, 37 P.3d 1130 (2001); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 
1381 (1996). 
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2. Corporate Director duty: Bingham Consolidation v. Groesbeck 
105 P.3d 365 (3004); Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (1998). 
3. Insurance agent responsibility: Black v. Allstate, 2004 UT 66; 
Campbell v. State Farm, 65 P.3d 1134 (2001). 
4. Banker's duty: FiveF. v. Heritage Savings 81 P.3d 105 (2003). 
5. Spousal duty to one another: Peirce v. Peirce 2000 UT 7. 
6. Trustee or Personal Representative: Perrenoud v. Harmon, 8 P.3d 
293 (2000); Oxmdine v. Overturf"973 P.2d 417 (1999); Matter of Estate of West, 
948 P.2d 351 (1997). 
7. Real Estate Broker/Agent: Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 82 P.3d 1064 
(2003); Russell/Packard Development v. Carson, 78 P.3d 616 (2003); Salt Lake 
County v. Western Dairyman, 48 P.3d 910 (2002); SLW/Utah v. Guardian Title 
970 P.2d 1265 1998); 
8. Stockbroker: Covey v. Covey 80 P.3d 553 (2003). 
9. Religious: Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
21 P.3d 198 (2001) 
While the above cases are interesting, they cannot form the basis for SAFs 
claim that a fiduciary relationship exists between the two co-employers of those 
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persons whose health insurance premiums were not timely paid. The definition of 
a fiduciary relationship set out in First Security v. Banberry, 786 P.2d 1326 (Utah, 
1996) clearly si pports the conclusion that AMC was not a fiduciary for SAI: 
A fiducic ry relationship imparts a position of peculiar confidence placed by 
one indh idual in another. A fiduciary is a person with a duty to act primarily 
for the be nefit of another. A fiduciary is in a position to have and exercise 
and does have and exercise influence over another. A fiduciary relationship 
implies a condition of superiority of one of the parties over the other. 
Generally, in a fiduciary relationship, the property, interest or authority of 
the other, is placed in the charge of the fiduciary. 
For insta ice: 
1. AMC did have have a duty to act primarily for SAI, but rather for 
the insureds; 
2., AMC was not in a position to have influence over SAI nor did it 
exercise nfluence over SAI; 
3. AMC clearly was not superior to SAI; and 
4. AMC did not have charge over any property, interest or authority 
of SAI, but rather over the property, interest and authority of the insureds. 
Two Uta i cases discussing fiduciary duty may be applicable to the case at 
bar. Semenov \. Hill, 982 P.2d 578 (1999) concerns a Russian speaking plaintiff 
(Semenov) who purchased a restaurant from Hill. At the closing, Semenov 
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claimed that he was presented with a 20 page document which he could not read 
under the circumstances and did not have time to read even if he could have 
understood its contents. However, he did sign the document, but later learned that 
the document d sclosed that the restaurant operated with negative cash flow. 
Semanov claims that a fiduciary duty arose at the closing when Hill became 
angry with Seir anov for hesitating in closing the purchase, and that Hill implied 
that Semanov s lould trust Hill. Semanov argues that the assertion of trust (similar 
to the trust which SAI claims AMC created when AMC represented it would pay 
health insurance premiums) gave rise to a fiduciary duty. Disagreeing, the Utah 
Supreme Court opined: 
Even assuming that Semenov trusted and relied upon Hill's alleged 
implied representation, merely depending on another does not create 
a fiduciary relationship. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts sec. 132 (1963) 
(emphasis added) Id. at 580. 
and thereby, the Utah Supreme Court negated the fiduciary duty claim which 
Semanov argued that the real estate agent owed to him. 
In the ca >e at bar, SAI claims no more than that it, similar to Semanov, 
depended upon the representation by AMC that AMC would timely pay the health 
insurance premiums. SAI obviously depended on AMC to carry out its 
representations of timely payment. From that mere dependence, SAI claims a 
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fiduciary relationship arose, however, application of the principles enunciated 
above in Semanov clearly results in a finding that there is no fiduciary duty created 
when a party merely depends upon performance by another party. 
Another Utah case, Grynberg v. Questar, 70 P.3d 1 (Utah 2003) involve a 
breach of contract dispute for the transportation of crude oil. The case involves an 
interesting disc ission of the economic loss doctrine and its application to breach of 
contract, stating 
This court . . . offers a clarification: the economic loss doctrine does 
noZ bar tort claims when those tort claims are based on a duty 
independent of those found in the contract. In arguing for common 
carrier liability and breach of fiduciary duty, the Grynbergs appear to 
realize the importance of identifying an independent duty. However, 
even accepting the Grynbergs' allegations as true, there is insufficient 
ev^  dence in the record to support a finding of common carrier liability 
orbther fiduciary obligations. Id. at 13. 
Ar obligation of fiduciary duty cannot be arbitrarily plucked from the 
mass of a litigant's pleadings and assertions at trial and given credence merely 
because of its existence. He asserting a fiduciary duty must establish the 
foundational points through sufficient and convincing evidence. As in Grynberg, 
supra, SAI is required to find and prove an independent duty apart from the 
contractual obligations between the parties before that elusive fiduciary duty 
appears. 
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SAI cleaily established a contractual duty between the parties requiring 
AMC to pay tht insurance premiums on a timely basis. Furthermore, SAI 
presented claims cognizable as damages in that SAI was required to pay from its 
own resources health claims not covered by health insurance due to a breach of 
contract by AMC. And all of such claims clearly fall under the rubric of breach 
of contract, albeit an oral contract. However, such claims do not give rise, and SAI 
has failed to prove, that there was a fiduciary duty established between SAI and 
AMC. Perhaps a fiduciary duty existed between AMC and those for whom the 
health insurance premiums were to protect, but SAI is one step too many removed 
from the chain of responsibility sufficient to create a fiduciary duty. SAI was 
merely dependent on AMC fulfillment of its contractual duties, thus precluding a 
finding of a fiduciary duty between the two co-employers, and thus further 
precluding a fir ding of a breach of fiduciary duty. 
As the court determines that no fiduciary duty existed between the parties, 
the court must therefore determine that AMC owes no attorney's fees to SAI for 
the only claim of attorney's fees arises as a result of the trial court's erroneous 
finding that a fiduciary duty existed. 
2. AMC PRESERVED ITS DEFENSE TO BREACH OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY AT TRIAL. 
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SAI claims (brief, pg 23, In 11-13) that AMC failed to preserve the issue of 
breach of fiduciary duty at trial. SAI correctly cites, but wrongly interprets 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal 966 P.2d 844 (Utah, 1998) which states that: 
A rial court has the opportunity to rule if the following three 
requirements are met: (1) "the issue must be raised in a timely 
fashion;" (2) "the issue must be specifically raised;" and (3) a party 
must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." 
(citing Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm 7z, 945 P2d 125, 130 (Utah, 
CtApp. 1997). 
While it s true that AMC did not raise the issue, SAI did raise the issue both 
at trial and thro igh its supporting trial memoranda. It presented the issue of 
whether there was a fiduciary duty "in a timely fashion," i.e. before and during the 
trial; it specific illy raised the issue (or otherwise the trial court would not have 
ruled on the iss le) and it introduced relevant legal authority. SAI somehow 
believes that in order for AMC to contest the issue that AMC needed to have raised 
the issue, brought up legal authority and argued the matter. Such belief is 
incorrect, for it is sufficient for one party to raise the issue for a court to be 
introduced to the question, analyze the matter and then give its ruling. Spears v. 
Warr 44 P.3d 142 (Utah, 2002) states: 
Ti e Warrs claim the issue was adequately preserved simply because 
the trial court ruled on it. We agree. By ruling on the question, the 
trial court demonstrated that the issue was brought to its attention, and 
the issue has been sufficiently preserved for our review. Id at 745. 
n 
Therefore, because the trial court did rule on the issue of fiduciary duty, the 
issue was clearly brought to the attention of the trial court and the "issue has been 
sufficiently preserved for . . . review." Id. 
3. DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF FUTURE PROFITS ARE TOO 
SPECULATIVE 
SAI arguas that it established its loss of profits with reasonable certainty, 
calling upon supposed experts who analyzed SAFs growth patterns in the past, 
evaluated the less of clients allegedly lost due to the actions of AMC and 
extrapolated the loss of clients over the future five years to determine how much in 
profits were lost by SAL The expert even went to the step of backing out of the 
equation for lo^t profits the cost of generating the profits. 
Howevei, regardless of how precise one tries to be in estimating future 
profits or the loss thereof, the process is but a guess, an estimate, a hunch based on 
experience. But regardless of the amount of experience any gaggle of experts can 
summon, future, events are unknown, for one cannot consider future changes in the 
economy, illness, death, changes in regulations or laws, adverse judicial opinions 
or a host of oth^r factors. Thus, future profits should not be considered as an 
element of dair ages. 
12 
The Idano Supreme Court in Just's v.Arrington Construction, 583 P.2d 997 
(Idaho 1978) analyzes a case in which a main street retail merchant in an Idaho city 
sued a contractor hired by the city to renovate the downtown area of the city. The 
contractor failed to complete the project on time, neglected to minimize 
construction roadblocks and refused to promote normal traffic flow, resulting in 
substantial economic losses to the merchant. 
The merchant sued under several theories, including negligence by the 
contractor for failure to minimize the economic impact of the reconstruction. The 
court looked at the duties imposed by the law upon the defendant with respect to 
the plaintiff's business and the resultant economic losses, not with respect to the 
written contract between the city and the contractor. 
The Court averred, as a general rule, no cause of action accrues against a 
defendant who?e actions prevent plaintiff from obtaining prospective economic 
advantage and cites Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 766C(c) (Tent. Draft No. 23, 1977); W. Prosser, 
supra, § 130; 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts, § 6.11 at 513 (1956); 
James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A 
Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 Vand.L.Rev. 43 (1972); Note, Negligent Interference 
With Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16 Stan.L.Rev. 664 (1964). 
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See also D. Dot bs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 6.4 at 466 (1973) and 
then quotes Pro sser: 
[61] "Certain types of interests, because of the various difficulties which they present, have been 
afforded relafively little protection at the hands of the law against negligent invasions. Thus interests of a 
pecuniary nature, such as the right to have a contract performed, the expectation of financial advantage, or 
the integrity 3f the pocketbook which may be damaged by reliance upon a representation, all present special 
problems . . . In general, however, it may be said that the law gives protection against negligent acts to the 
interest in security of the person, and all interests in tangible property. In other words, negligence may 
result in iiablity for personal injury or property damage." W. Prosser, supra, § 54 at 327. 
[63] "Th's cause of action has run parallel to that for interference with existing contracts. Again the tort 
began with 'malice', and it has remained very largely a matter of at least intent to interfere. Cases have been 
quite infrequent in which even the claim has been advanced that the defendant through his negligence has 
prevented th' plaintiff from obtaining a prospective pecuniary advantage; and the usual statement is that 
there can be 10 cause of action in such a case. There are, however, a few situations in which recovery has 
been permitted, all of them apparently to be justified upon the basis of some special relation between the 
parties.. . . Pi all probability, as in the case of interference with existing contracts, liability for negligence is 
not impossib e, but it must depend upon the existence of some special reason for finding a duty of care. No 
case has beei found in which intended but purely incidental interference resulting from the pursuit of the 
defendant's c wn ends by proper means has been held to be actionable." Id., § 130 at 952. 
The Idaho Court adopts the ban against awarding prospective economic 
losses and explains its decision, in part, as follows: 
[65] Though the rule has been expressed in different ways, the common underlying pragmatic 
consideration is that a contrary rule, which would allow compensation for losses of economic advantage 
caused by the defendant's negligence, would impose too heavy and unpredictable a burden on the 
defendant's conduct 
[69] Thi' plaintiff is surely not the only person who may have suffered some pecuniary losses as a 
result of the downtown renovation project. For example, others who may have suffered pecuniary losses 
could conceivably include not only all the other businesses in the area, but also their suppliers, creditors, 
and so forth.'ad infinitum. In contrast to the recognized liability for personal injuries and property damage, 
with its inherent limitations of size, parties and time, liability for all the economic repercussions of a 
negligent ac, would be virtually open-ended. Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio 
App.1946). f the defendant's liability were extended to all those who suffered any pecuniary loss, its 
liability cou d become grossly disproportionate to its fault. Such potential liability would unduly burden any 
construction in a business area. 
Plaintiff urges this court to follow the above reasoning propounded by the 
Idaho Supreme Court and to disallow any award for prospective loss of future 
profits. 
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CONCLUSION 
The issue of the existence of a fiduciary duty was preserved ror review Dy 
this Court due to the fact that the trial court considered and ruled on the matter. 
However, the trial court erred when it ruled there existed a fiduciary duty between 
the two co-employers of the affected employees. AMC was not a fiduciary of the 
funds paid for health insurance premiums to SAI, but a contractual partner, a joint 
venturer, a co-employer. SAI depended on AMC to make the payments timely and 
the mere existence of such dependence precludes the finding of a fiduciary duty 
between the parties. 
Therefore, the award of attorneys' fees based upon breach of a fiduciary 
duty should be overturned. 
Finally, the award for prospective profits should be overturned as being too 
speculative. 
Dated thib day of May, 2005. 
DONALD JOSEPH PURSER 
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15 
Appellant's brief, postage prepaid, to: 
as 
Matthew C. Barneck 
Brian C. Webber 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main 
Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
on the JlJtliLy of May, 2005. 
16 
